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In the midst of the international financial crisis, the German federal government passed 
the Risk Limitation Act in autumn 2007. In spring 2008 the Bundestag has finally 
decided on the law. The domestic private equity/buyout providers, which have not 
previously been subject to banking supervision, are among the main addressees of the 
act. Among others, “objectionable macroeconomic activities of financial investors” 
are to be hindered or prevented, without simultaneously “impairing efficient financial 
and corporate transactions”. In short, the regulation of activities is intended to have 
a stabilizing effect in the midst of turbulent times. 
Private equity funds can particularly be regarded as a supplement to the traditional 
instruments of corporate financing. In a study recently presented by DIW Berlin, it 
was determined that private equity funds generally do not swarm in on German 
companies “like locusts”. Their macroeconomic significance has so far tended to be 
minor. An expansion of commitment by private equity funds would be welcomed. 
Particularly SMEs can profit from it. 
Private equity funds and hedge funds are frequently grouped under the umbrella 
term of “financial investors” in this country, also in the Risk Limitation Act. For 
both types of funds, intensive monitoring is envisaged, equally by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).
Private equity investors are primarily active on the market for debt-financed cor-
porate acquisitions (leverage buy-outs).1 The necessary equity capital for these 
acquisitions is provided by the buy-out funds and—to a lesser extent—also the future 
management of the acquired companies.2 The debt capital generally comes from 
a syndicate comprised of banks and increasingly also institutional investors. After 
conclusion of the acquisition, the different risk-bearing loan tranches are passed 
on to the participating investors and, in some cases, also to the market.3 The share 
of debt capital in the total acquisition price generally fluctuates between 60% and 
1  The focus of a study by DIW Berlin is on first-round buy-outs, cf. Schäfer, D., Fisher, A.: Die Bedeutung von Buy-Outs/
Ins für unternehmerische Effzienz, Effektivität und Corporate Governance. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt 38, 
2008, www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/78948/diwkompakt_2008-038.pdf.
2  European Commission: Report of the Alternative Investment Expert Group—Developing European Private Equity. 
2006.
3  European Central Bank: Large Banks and Private Equity-Sponsored Leveraged Buyouts in the EU. 2007, www.ecb. 
int/pub/pdf/other/largebanksandprivateequity200704en.pdf.Fear of financial investors unjustified
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80% (Figure 1).4 The aim of the fund is to generate 
a high return. The investment horizon is usually 
limited to several years.
In contrast to buy-out funds, hedge funds are gener-
ally aimed at the utilization of volatilities in mature 
debt capital and equity capital markets. One of the 
better-known varieties amongst the extensive range 
of hedge fund strategies is to search out undervalued 
equity capital.5 In order to immediately be able to 
take advantage of price changes, the investment 
horizon of hedge funds is usually for a shorter term 
than for buy-out funds. Furthermore, in contrast 
to buy-out funds, hedge funds mainly appear as 
“shareholder activists”, when the price of the target 
company can be changed to the profit-making direc-
tion in the short term. Hedge funds also incur debt at 
the fund level while, for buy-out funds, the debt is 
occurred at the level of the target company, and loans 
are secured directly with the available assets.
In 2005, the total funding originating from Germany 
for buy-out funds amounted to 4.5 billion euro. On 
an international scale, this sum is low.
In spite of this, only two-thirds (2.9 billion euro) 
were also managed in Germany. In contrast, British 
4  However, historical buy-outs in the USA were also carried out at the 
end of the 1980s with debt capital portions of more than 90%.
5  Schäfer, D.: Hedge-Fonds—Eine gute Anlageform? Weekly Report of 
DIW Berlin No. 32/2004.
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managers manage more than double the funds on 
the British Isles, at 45.6 billion euro (Figure 2). A 
similar picture emerges in 2006. Germany is there-
fore an exporter and Great Britain is an importer 
of buy-out funds.
It is not very likely that the reason for this net out-
flow of funds is a lack of worthwhile investment 
opportunities in Germany. This conclusion is, at 
least, apparent from a simultaneous glance at the 
investments (Figure 3). Only 50% of the total funds 
invested (7.2 billion euro in 2006) by buy-out funds 
in Germany came from domestic buy-out funds. The 
total investments in Great Britain amounted to 25.5 
billion euro (2006), resp. 11.9 billion euro (2005). 
However, in 2005 and 2006, British fund managers 
invested a total of 23.8 billion euro (200% of the 
total investments in Britain), resp. 40.9 billion euro 
(174% of the total investments in Great Britain).Fear of financial investors unjustified
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While Germany is obviously primarily interesting 
as an investment country, Great Britain appears to 
be particularly attractive as a financial centre. 
Buy-Outs in Germany are increasing
Within a few years, buy-outs have risen to become 
the most important segment in the private equity 
sector in Germany and Europe. In 2006, 75% of 
private equity fundraising and 70.7% of investments 
were attributed to the buy-out sector.6
According to information from the Centre for Man-
agement Buy-Out Research (CMBOR), in 2006, 
financial investors acquired companies at a value 
of 21.6 billion euro.7 The transaction volume grew 
by around two-thirds, compared with 2005. The 
6  European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (EVCA): Jahr-
bücher.
7  CMBOR: European Management Buy-outs Jan-Dec 2006.
previous highest number of 155 transactions was 
achieved in 2006; this means an increase of 25%. 
A good fifth of the continental European buy-outs 
were realized in Germany in 2006. The number of 
buy-outs was significantly higher in Great Britain 
during the same year, at a total of 676; this was 
nearly the same amount as for the rest of Europe.
This market is still underdeveloped in Germany, 
measured on the basis of economic power. If the 
buy-out volume of Great Britain and Germany (Fig-
ure 4) is compared, it becomes clear that the German 
market is lagging behind.
Inflows of equity capital and debt capital 
from buy-outs
With equity capital, companies not only “insure” 
themselves against liquidity and income risks. This 
financing mode is also a “door-opener” for debt 
capital, in times of internal ratings for companies 
by commercial banks (Basel II). In Germany, equity 
capital is scarcer than in other countries. Market 
capitalization lies behind Great Britain, the USA and 
even behind France (Figure 5). Among other things, 
the German financial system is also described as 
being particularly bank-centered for this reason. 
With low significance of market equity capital, off-
market investment financing is becoming all the 
more important; a possibly existing equity capital 
gap could be closed with this. Private equity funds 
are one of the few available sources for off-market 
equity capital. 
The ability of private equity funds to activate a great 
deal of debt capital for the acquisition of a target 
company, in addition to equity capital, has had a 
strong influence on promoting the negative image 
of financial investors among the German public. 
However, the inherent idea of equity capital as a 
“good” and debt capital as a “bad” form of financing 
is not justified from the financial point of view. If 
the debt capital interest rate is below the expected 
total return, a higher debt ratio causes the equity 
ratio to rise. For tax reasons, it is also attractive to 
work with a high portion of debt capital. For this 
reason, the equity ratios are also low with German 
sole proprietorships and private companies, and 
these ratios only provide a limited indication of as-
sets and available reserves (additional contributions) 
for eliminating a debt crisis.8
Not least, debt capital plays a significant part in 
corporate management. Jensen describes high debt 
8  Deutsche Bundesbank: Monthly Report December 2006—Zur wirt-
schaftlichen Situation kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen in Deutsch-
land seit 1997. Frankfurt  2006.
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as a “carrot and stick” strategy. It also permits the 
concentration of property and therefore a compa-
rably high participation by management. The latter 
guarantees high performance incentives (“carrots”). 
At the same time, the high debt and the inherent 
threat of rapidly losing your own position through 
insolvency, with poor performance, is like a hard 
sanction mechanism (“stick”).9
9  Jensen, M. C.: Agency Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 1986, 323–29.
On the debit side of high debt is primarily the risk 
of insolvency. However, the willingness of private 
equity funds is presumably high for preventing pure 
liquidity-related insolvencies of buy-outs by provid-
ing additional equity capital. On the one hand, in 
the case of insolvency, own return on investment is 
wasted. On the other hand, private equity compa-
nies rely on establishing their reputation as buyers 
of companies and reliable contractual partners of 
the banks.
However, it has to be noted that corporate insol-
vencies are a normal part of business activity and 
therefore also a normal part of the buy-out market. 
Indications of “excessive” insolvency risk of buy-
outs are not identifiable so far, despite several bad 
investments (e.g. Bundesdruckerei), which have 
been publicised.
Reasons for the creation of a buy-out 
market
The reasons for the creation of buy-out markets ex-
tend from increased options for eliminating so-called 
family “cluster risks” through improved corporate 
governance, as well as realization of specialization 
advantages (das wort simpler wurde entfernt), to the 
point of reducing financing limitations. 
Family “cluster risks”
For various reasons, family-owned companies in 
particular do not have the option available to them 
Figure 4
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Figure 5
Market capitalization1 in selected 
countries















1 Aggregated market value of listed companies.
Source: World Development Indicators.   DIW Berlin 2008Fear of financial investors unjustified
46 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 7/2008
of spreading assets. External financing limitations 
and stock market access, which is frequently not 
available to small and medium-sized companies, 
force entrepreneur families not only to concentrate 
on their personal manpower, but also on personal 
assets in their own company. A well-functioning 
buy-out market opens up opportunities for family-
owned companies to bring their risk preferences 
and their financial investment into harmony and 
eliminate the family cluster risk through a partial 
or complete sale. 
The number of sales of family-owned and other 
private sole proprietorships, as a proportion of buy-
out funds in 2006 and their high market share, show 
that demand apparently exists for this financing 
instrument in Germany (table). This is indicated by 
the fact that, according to the CMBOR, the typical 
SMW sales below 10 million euro have also reached 
a new record level, with 87 buy-outs.
Improved corporate governance
Buy-outs play a different role when listed companies 
are involved, with shares that are widely spread. 
The anonymity of listed equity capital weakens the 
incentive to control management, as only the active 
investor bears the costs of control, but earnings ben-
efit everyone. Therefore, the management can also 
pursue personal goals, such as aiming for power, 
income and prestige, to the detriment of the share-
holders. Against this background, the US economist, 
Michael Jensen, interprets the buy-out transactions, 
aimed at owner concentration and direct investment 
by management, as an instrument for reinstating the 
unity of ownership and control.10
Advantages of specialization
In addition to a lack of incentive for control, the ef-
ficiency brakes in a large company frequently also 
include the coexistence of several subsidiaries. If 
lack of synergy effects and strong competition force 
management to return to the core business, “remote 
group units” are cut off from internal capital market 
and company resources. This results in an incentive 
for parent and subsidiary companies to initiate a 
buy-out and realize specialization advantages.11
10 Jensen, M. C.: Eclipse of the Public Corporation. Harvard Business Re-
view, 1989, revised 1997; Jensen, M. C.: The Modern Industrial Revolu-
tion: Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance 
48, 1993, 831–80.
11  Working Group “Financing“ of the Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft für 
Betriebswirtschaft e.V.: Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Veräußerung 
von Konzernteilen an Private-Equity-Investoren. Zeitschrift für betriebs-
wirtschaftliche Forschung 58, 2006, 235–264.
Reduction of financing limitations
Asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and 
capital investors and behavior risks limit the financ-
ing opportunities for companies. This can result in 
rationing by lenders—or as regards listing in an illiq-
uid stock market segment—by the capital market.12 
Companies that are owned privately and by families 
are regarded as being particularly intransparent for a 
potential lender or shareholder and therefore tend to 
be limited in terms of financing. Buy-out funds can 
alleviate this. Off-market equity capital is suitable 
for strengthening the companies’ assets. 
Furthermore, due to close links with the credit in-
dustry, buy-out specialists are often in a position of 
being able to activate additional debt capital.13
Effects of buy-outs—Experiences in the 
USA
The available findings on leveraged buy-outs (LBO) 
are mainly based on US data and, therefore, on the 
historical precursors to the most recent wave of 
LBOs. In the USA, between 1981 and 1989, buy-
out companies purchased more than 2540 listed 
companies, with a market value of 297 billion US 
dollars. LBOs represented 7.5% of all takeovers and 
17% of the transaction volume, in terms of value. In 
12 Stiglitz, J. E., Weiss, A.: Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information. American Economic Review 71, 1981, 393–410.
13 European Central Bank: Large Banks ..., a. a. O.
Table
Buy-Outs/Buy-Ins in Germany, according to origin 
Sale by ... 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number
Family-owned or private company 19 9 14 27 38
Foreign parent company 18 16 17 24 17
Domestic parent company 47 42 49 48 53
Privatization 0 0 0 0 1
Reorganization/insolvency 15 12 5 5 3
Buy-out fund1 2 14 18 12 31
Others 1 3 1 3 1
Unknown 6 9 7 5 11
Total 108 105 111 124 155
Shares in percent
Family-owned or private companies 17.6 8.6 12.6 21.8 24.5
Foreign parent company 16.7 15.2 15.3 19.4 11.0
Domestic parent company 43.5 40.0 44.1 38.7 34.2
Privatization 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Reorganization/insolvency 13.9 11.4 4.5 4.0 1.9
Buy-out fund1 1.9 13.3 16.2 9.7 20.0
Others 0.9 2.9 0.9 2.4 0.6
Unknown 5.6 8.6 6.3 4.0 7.1
1 Onward sale of a previous buy-out to a buy-out fund
Quellen: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte. DIW Berlin 2008Fear of financial investors unjustified
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the peak year of 1988, 410 LBOs were carried out 
at a total value of 18 billion US dollars.
In connection with these acquisitions, the findings 
range from above-average price gains for the ex-
isting shareholders of around 42% after takeover 
offers by buy-out companies to a 30% increase in 
the return on sales to a productivity increase for 
buy-out companies lying above the corresponding 
industry average.14 With LBOs carried out in the 
late 1980s, above-average financial crises frequently 
occurred later. However, the consequences of these 
insolvencies for the owners were contained, so that 
a debate took place in economic research regarding 
so-called “strategic insolvencies”.15
Efficiency gains compared with pure asset 
shifting
The LBOs of the 1980s were also controversial in 
the USA. The greatest resistance to mainly debt-
financed corporate acquisitions came from the 
managers of large companies, the unions and from 
politics.16 As proponents of restrictive regulation 
of LBOs, they assess the asset gains of the owners 
as “too expensively purchased”, with the losses of 
other actors who are associated with the company. 
Central points of controversy were effects on em-
ployment and wage level, losses for the previous 
creditors and potential tax losses for the treasury. 
The theory of “too expensively purchased” asset 
gains in case of the owners was not able to be em-
pirically confirmed. If the reduction of jobs could 
be proven in the studies, this tended to relate to 
oversized administrative areas, but not production 
areas. If debt capital devaluation took place, this 
remained limited to previous owners, without pro-
tective clauses, in the loan agreements.17 A portion 
of the LBO-induced value gains were, in fact, able 
to be attributed to tax savings.18 However, overall, 
a positive tax effect was assumed—among other 
14 Kaplan, S.: The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Perfor-
mance and Value. Journal of Financial Economics 24, 1989, 217–254; 
Smart, S. B., Waldfogel, J.: Measuring the Effect of Restructuring on Cor-
porate Performance: The Case of Management Buyouts. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 76, 1994, 503–511; Lichtenberg, F. R., Siegel, D. 
S.: The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects 
of Firm Behavior. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 1990, 165–194.
15 Cf. Schäfer, D.: Restructuring Know-How and Collateral. Kredit und 
Kapital 35, 2002, 572–594.
16 Jensen, M. C.: Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 4, 1991, 13–33.
17 Asquith, P., Wizman, T.: Event Risk, Wealth Redistribution, and its Re-
turn to Existing Bondholders in Corporate Buyouts. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1990, 195–213; Palepu, K. G.: Consequences of Leveraged 
Buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 1990, 247–262.
18 Kaplan, S.: Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of 
Value. The Journal of Finance 44, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the 
Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New 
York. 1989, 611–632.
things, due to additional capital gains taxes with 
the previous shareholders and taxes on extra interest 
income with regard to the lenders.19
At the beginning of the 1990s, it already became 
clear that important macroeconomic indicators in 
the US economy, such as labour costs, capital em-
ployment, wage development, the unemployment 
rate and expenditures on research and development 
had developed positively in the 1980s. A compari-
son of the development of work productivity in the 
USA and in the euro area supports the theory that 
no negative economic effects have resulted from 
the restructuring wave of the 1980s, which wereas 
mainly supported by LBOs (Figure 6).20 In con-
trast, in the euro area, where such restructuring has 
not yet taken place, a comparable effect cannot be 
recognized.
More recent findings
When drawing upon the more recent findings, these 
confirm a positive effect of LBO activity on the 
share price and the productivity of the affected com-
panies.21 In contrast, signs of effects on employment 
19 Jensen, M. C., Kaplan S., Stiglin, L.: Effects of LBOs on Tax Revenues of 
the US Treasury. Tax Notes 42, 1989, 727–33.
20 Wiersema, M. F., Porter-Liebeskind, J.: The Effects of Leveraged Buy-
outs on Corporate Growth and Diversification in Large Firms. Strategic 
Management Journal 16, 1995, 447–460.
21 Harris, R., Siegel, D. S., Wright, M.: Assessing the Impact of Manage-
Figure 6
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development in connection with LBOs are rare. However, in a  British-Dutch com-
parative study regarding the effects of LBOs on the employees, positive effects were 
found in both countries on advanced training, participation of the employees in busi-
ness activities, employment and wage levels and on employee participation.22
Conclusion
Buy-outs by financial investors have become the most important segment of the 
private equity sector in Germany in recent years. Two drivers are assumed for these 
trends, with respect to supply and demand: On the one hand, efficiency advantages 
result from the restructuring of affected companies, on the other hand, demand 
for innovative financial instruments can be assumed. Both aspects have a positive 
effect on the “coming together” of company buyers and sellers. These statements 
are compatible with the majority of the findings of relevant empirical economic 
research.
Without bank loans and liquid bond markets, buy-outs are not conceivable. The 
current liquidity crisis in the banking sector and the quasi collapse of the market 
for credit sales therefore also leave traces in the private equity sector and tend to 
have a restrictive effect. Clear legal regulations that do not impair the market are 
all the more important.
ment Buyouts on Economic Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the United Kingdom. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 2005, 148–153. Andres, C., Betzer, A., Weir, C.: Shareholder Wealth Gains Through Better Corporate 
Governance—The Case Of European LBO-Transactions. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, soon to be pu-
blished.
22 Bruining, H., Boselie, P., Wright, M., Bacon, N.: The Impact of Business Ownership Change on Employee Relations: 
Buy-outs in the UK and the Netherlands. ERIM Report Series Research in Management, 2004.